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Political developments in China during the decade since the death of Mao Ze- 
dong form the theme of the following analysis; particular emphasis is laid on 
reform of the economic and political system, as it has been advocated, and to 
some extent put into practice, since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee in December 1978. 
The Third Plenum was the fountainhead for nearly all the new trends which 
have emerged since. This presentation is divided into three parts: (1) from 
1978 to the adoption of the Decision on Economic Reform in October 1984; 
(2) the problems and contradictions encountered in the application of these 
policies during the ensuing year and a half, from late 1984 to early 1986; and 
(3) the situation since the spring of 1986 and the prospects for the future. 
From the Third Plenum of 1978 to the Third Plenum of 1984' 
It is perhaps worth recalling, as a brief introduction, that Mao was not, in 
principle, hostile to economic development, nor did he object to the concept 
of "modernization". On the contrary, he freely used the term (jindaihua, xian- 
daihua) from the 1940s to the 1960s. During his last two decades, however, 
while he continued to stress the importance of economic progress, his increas- 
ing anxiety about the corrupting effects of prosperity, and of inequality, led 
him to adopt a series of radical policies which, in the end, proved self-defeat- 
ing. The Great Leap Forward resulted in economic disaster and starvation, 
and the so-called "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" tore the fabric of 
society apart. Thus, when he died in September 1976, Mao left China in a par- 
lous state. His successors, first Hua Guofeng and then Deng Xiaoping, have 
had to struggle with the problem of rescuing the country from this situation. 
Hua Guofeng's solution was to follow a "two-track policy. On the one 
hand, he pursued a grandiose programme of modernization and import of 
foreign technology, before China was either ready to use it or able to pay for 
it. But he did this behind a screen of Maoist and Cultural Revolution slogans, 
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thus trying to please both the "left" and the "right" of the Party. (He also tried 
to emulate Mao in building up his own cult.) 
Hua summed up his political views in the famous slogan of the "two what- 
ever~": whatever words Mao had uttered were sacred, and whatever exam- 
ples he had set must be followed forever. A crucial role in the struggle against 
the "Whateverists" was played by three great debates during the year 1978. 
The first, on the topic "Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth, meant in 
effect that results were more important than dogma. The second, about the 
appropriateness of the criterion of remuneration according to work in a so- 
cialist society, implied the negation of the egalitarianism which had prevailed, 
to a very substantial degree, since 1958, with Mao's personal support. The 
third, about the need to observe objective economic laws, contradicted Mao's 
view that the masses, when mobilized under the guidance of his thought, 
could do anything, overcoming all material difficulties. 
By the end of 1978, the situation had progressed to such a point that, at the 
Third Plenum in December, Deng Xiaoping was able to obtain approval for 
the "responsibility system" in economic work, which has, as is well-known, 
been the cornerstone of China's reform policies ever since. This principle, 
which began to receive concrete application in the countryside in 1979, had a 
dual thrust. On the one hand, it was plainly antLegalitarian. 
On the other hand, it implied a growing role for the market. Hua Guofeng 
was replaced as Chairman in mid-1981, and in September 1982 ceased to to be 
even a member of the Politburo, remaining simply an ordinary,member of the 
Central Committee. The era of Deng Xiaoping had begun, though he did not, 
like Mao and Hua, become Chairman, and the post itself was abolished. 
Deng Xiaoping was, and remains, committed to the progressive and radical 
reform of the Chinese economy, and he believes that this reform must be ac- 
companied by the "liberation of thought", the smashing of "forbidden zones", 
and the strengthening of democracy and the legal system which he demanded 
in December 1978 at the Third Plenum. But while he regards the creation of a 
freer atmosphere as essential to modernization, there are both "external" and 
"internal" limits to the extent or kind of freedom or democracy he is prepared 
I to accept. 
By "external" limits I mean limits set by the balance of forces within the Par- 
ty, and expecially within the top leadership. In my view Chinese politics since 
1978 should not be seen in terms of clearly defined and well-organized fac- 
tions. There are, however, quite obviously sharp differences of opinion 
within the leadership, and alliances have progressively taken shape based on 
Ideology and policy in China in the era of reform, 1978-1986 
these differences. When a large number of his colleagues are worried by the 
consequences of his policies, Deng cannot afford to proceed uncompromis- 
ingly with these policies. 
But at the same time, Deng Xiaoping is assuredly not, as he is sometimes 
called in the West, a "pragmatist". He is a veteran revolutionary, who believes 
in the dictatorship of the proletariat, the vanguard role of the Party, and a cer- 
tain number of moral values he learned during the Yan'an period. When, the- 
refore, free discussion, or relatively free local-level elections, appear to be de- 
veloping a momentum which threatens Party control, he himself feels obliged 
(quite apart from what other leaders may think) to call a halt. The limitations 
set by the ideas or instinctive reactions of Deng Xiaoping himself and of other 
partisans of reform to their own actions are called "internal" limits on reform. 
This point is sufficiently well documented from the record of Deng's words 
and deeds, in the zigzag course of events during the past eight years. In De- 
cember 1978 he gave, informally at least, his blessing to "Democracy Wall", 
but three months later, in March 1979, he himself drew a line by setting up the 
"four basic principles" of support for the socialist road, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the leadership of the Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Ze- 
dong Thought. His theoretical spokesmen have made it quite plain that he did 
so partly because, only three months after the Third Plenum, he was still vul- 
nerable to attack from Hua Guofeng and the "Whateverists", but at the same 
time there is no doubt that he himself believes in these four principles, and had 
lost patience with the unofficial "democracy movement". 
Similarly, Deng Xiaoping made, in August 1980, a remarkable speech 
about the need for the "democratization" (minzhuhua) of the Party and state 
leadership systems, in which he blamed the "excessive powers" assumed by 
Mao Zedong not only on the old Chinese tradition of "feudal autocracy", but 
on patterns established by the Comintern. Some of his spokesmen, such as 
Liao Gailong, even traced the source of these errors to Lenin himself. But then, 
after the arrest of most of the remaining leaders of the "democracy movement" 
in the spring of 1981, Deng took the lead in the criticism of the writer Bai Hua. 
In this case, too, he was no doubt moved by both "internal" and "external" 
constraints. He probably did not like Bai Hua's "Bitter Love", but the tighten- 
ing of controls in 1981 was manifestly linked to the phase of "consolidation" in 
the economic reforms which Deng had announced in December 1980, and 
which probably did not reflect so much his own instincts as the reticence of 
others in the leadership regarding the dismantling of the old-style command- 
type economy and the introduction of a greater role for the market. 
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This interplay between "internal" and "external" factors became much plai- 
ner in the case of the third cycle of loosening and tightening of controls, in 
1982-1983. The Twelfth Congress in September 1982 saw a strengthening of 
the position of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and other like- 
minded figures within the top leadership, and a renewed stress on democratic 
reform, side by side with the call to build "socialist spiritual civilization". But 
then, in the autumn of 1983, there emerged the curious affair of the campaign 
against "spiritual pollution". 
In the spring of 1983, the line of the Chinese Communist Party was marked 
by three propositions which still today, to a large extent, characterize the 
overall trend of Chinese politics. There was first of all the slogan "Carry out 
reform resolutely, but in proper order" (jianjue, er you zhixu de gaige). Both 
halves of this were and are important. There must be no turning back in the re- 
forms, but at the same time they must not be allowed to get out of control. The 
second point was the stress on knowledge, the assimilation of the most mod- 
ern high technology, and going beyond that, the call to promote intellectuals 
to positions of authority, and not merely to use them as advisers or experts. 
Thirdly, there was in early 1983 the clear statement, constantly repeated, that 
"leftism" was the main danger, and that leftists in the Party must be made to 
reform, or eliminated from leading posts. 
In September-October 1983, at the Second Plenum of the 12th Central 
Commitee, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun jointly put forward a demand to 
carry out extensive ideological work aimed at eliminating what was called 
"spriritual pollution". This "work, which soon developed in fact into some- 
thing very much like the "campaigns" (yundong) which had taken place in 
Mao's day, had two main targets. At the level of upper and middle-level ca- 
dres and intellectuals, it was directed against insufficiently orthodox ideas, 
especially at the theories about humanism, and about the existence of aliena- 
tion under socialism, put forward by Zhou Yang, Wang Ruoshui and others. 
At the grass roots, it became an attack on foreign influences and on all sorts of 
"depraved" behaviour, especially in the sexual domain, and also on the activ- 
ities and life style of those who had followed Deng Xiaoping's injunction to en- 
rich themselves in the context of the responsibility system. 
Why did Deng Xiaoping initially approve this campaign, and why did he 
subsequently call a halt to it? Undoubtedly he launched it in part because, as 
already observed, he is a veteran revolutionary who genuinely believes in 
~a rx i s t '  ideals, and in the "revolutionary spirit" inherited from Yan'an, and 
does not want them called into question by too much enthusiasm for "bour- 
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geois liberalism", individualism, and other wrong ideas. But it is certainly no 
accident that this campaign was started simultaneously with the beginning of 
the "Rectification Campaign" in the Party aiming primarily at rooting out 
Cultural Revolution leftists. At a time when he was attacking the left, Deng as- 
suredly did not want to be seen by those worried about this purge as "soft on 
capitalism". 
The reasons for the abandonment of the campaign against "spiritual pollu- 
tion" in March 1984 are even clearer. The political climate which had devel- 
oped in this context, and especially the attacks on those who had '%ecome rich 
first" and the confiscation of their wealth in some cases, was badly disrupting 
the work on the reform and development of the economy, which Deng Xiao- 
ping regarded as of primary importance. He therefore refused to authorize the 
open publication of his September 1983 speech on "spiritual pollution", for 
fear of prolonging and intensifying the campaign, and stopped the campaign 
abruptly. In this context, there is great symbolic significance in his visit to 
Shenzhen, in February 1984. On his return to Beijing, he talked with senior 
comrades, and expressed his enthusiasm for the "open policy" in general, and 
the special economic zones in particular. They were, he said, a window for im- 
porting both foreign technology and foreign techniques of management. He 
endorsed the slogan current in Shenzhen, "Time is money". (I do not know 
whether or not he was aware that this slogan was originally coined by the 
American capitalist J.P. Morgan.) It was right, he said, for some areas such as 
this to become rich first. "Egalitarianism will not work."2 
There followed, in March and April, a shift in economic policy not only to- 
ward the reaffirmation of the responsibility system in the countryside, but to- 
ward its much more sweeping extension to industry and the cities. This went 
hand in hand with the re-definition of the main enemy as, once again, "left- 
ism" rather than rightism or bourgeois influences. Hu Yaobang played a very 
important role in this respect; the editorial of People's Daily on 1 April 1984, 
which was in fact a summary of a talk by Hu, declared that, in the aftermath 
of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, it would take years of 
work to root out the leftist poison. The entrepreneur, whether he be the enter- 
prising peasant who gets rich first in the countryside, or the manager of a col- 
lectively-owned factory in the city, was hailed as the hero of the present age. 
The seal was set on this new upsurge of reform at the Third Plenum of the 
12th Central Committee in October 1984. Like the Third Plenum of the 11th 
Central Committee in December 1978 which had started the whole process, 
this meeting was important because of the political line it adopted, rather than 
because of any precise and detailed policy decisions. The crucial point was 
that the Chinese economy was explicitly defined as a "planned socialist com- 
modity economy". Henceforth, theoretical discussions of commodities and of 
the role of the market would be regarded as completely legitimate, contrary to 
the situation in 1980-81, when Chen Yun's ideas of the market as a '%ird" in 
the "cage" of the planned economy predominated. The Decision adopted by 
the Central Committee on this occasion called for devolving "decision-mak- 
ing power" to enterprises. It also spoke out once again against egalitarianism, 
and stressed that the open-door policy would be maintained. 
From October 1984 to the adoption of the Seventh 
Five-Year Plan 
The end of the year 1984 was marked by a high tide of free discussion and of 
criticism of dogmatism in all its forms. The famous article in People's Daily of 
7 December 1984 entitled "Theory and RealityUl3 which was widely inter- 
preted outside China as a repudiation of Marxism, did not in fact say any such 
thing. It simply stated the view, which had been advanced many times since 
the hundredth anniversary of Marx's death in 1983, that he had lived a long 
time ago, and that all of today's problems could not be solved merely by refer- 
ring to his works on the shelf. The point was, however, stated very strongly in 
the article of 7 December, and was given added authority by the fact that this 
article, like that of 1 April 1984, was a summary of a talk by Hu Yaobang. 
Thus, while Marx and Marxism were in no sense to be abandoned, they were 
to be interpreted flexibly, and new ideas developed to deal with the problems 
of the present age. 
The end of December 1984 also saw the call by Hu Qili, widely regarded as 
Hu Yaobang's probable successor, at the congress of the Writers' Association, 
for "ample" (chongfen de) creative freedoms4 But at the same time, in late 
1984, prices were rising steeply, the economy was "overheating", credit was 
being expanded recklessly, and above all the so-called "evil winds" or "un- 
righteous winds" (buzheng zhi feng) of corruption and abuse of privilege were 
beginning to blow. According to later accounts, the Central Committee took 
note of these problems as early as December 1984; in February and March 
1985 it began to act against such tendencies. The main problems raised were 
polarization, and the threat of the emergence of a new bourgeoisie; specula- 
tion and black market transactions; and above all the misuse of official posi- 
tions to engage in business through intermediaries. 
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Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and others sharply denounced these pheno- 
mena in February and March 1985, but at the same time they stressed that 
measures against such "unrighteous winds" were indispensable precisely be- 
cause, if these negative side effects were not eliminated, the reforms them- 
selves, which Deng Xiaoping characterized in March 1985 as a "second revo- 
lution", equal in importance to that of 1949,= would be compromised. 
The ambiguity of the situation, and the difficulty of analyzing develop- 
ments simply in terms of "factions", is illustrated by contradictory attitudes in 
the spring of 1985. Thus Hu Qiaomu, who had been the ''backstage boss" of 
the campaign against spiritual pollution (with Chen Yun's support), wrote in 
April 1985 that Marxism must take into account information theory, that the 
previous system making socialism a "huge cartel with all workers being its 
staff members" would not work, and that the individual "may play a positive 
role in society, and even in socialist s~ciety".~ While this relative conservative 
was making statements such as these, Hu Yaobang, who had refused to have 
anything whatsoever to do with the "spiritual pollution" campaign of 1983- 
84, made a relatively hard and doctrinaire speech on journalism in February 
1985, and had this openly published, thus adding to its impact, in April 1985. 
He said that journalism was not like literature, and could not enjoy the same 
freedoms, for it was the mouthpiece of the Party. It was right to oppose "spiri- 
tual pollution", though one shouldn't talk about it too much.7 Thus both 
wings of Party opinion appeared to be shifting toward the middle, or toward a 
certain common ground. 
The September 1985 Party Conference saw what can only be characterized 
as a stand-off between the two powerful old men, Deng Xiaoping and Chen 
Yun. Their speeches were not wholly contradictory, but the emphasis was 
quite different. Deng said, in effect, that while there were negative effects of 
the new policies, such as economic crimes, etc., and these must be combatted, 
the reforms themselves, and the opening to the outside world, must be pushed 
boldly forward. Chen Yun stressed rather the negative consequences of the re- 
forms, and the need to strengthen ideological work, and to reinforce the pre- 
stige of the organs concerned with pr~paganda .~  
During the half-year following the Conference of autumn 1985 problems 
continued to manifest themselves. The Chinese leadership had to surmount 
difficulties caused by the lack of experience, not only in China, but in any 
communist-ruled country, in operating a system with as extensive a role as 
this for the market. The problem of inflation in prices for consumer goods, 
especially in the cities, was particularly acute. And yet, the impulse toward 
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reform, and the key ideas accompanying the reform, survived. 
In its New Year editorial on 1 January 1986, People's Daily called for a rela- 
tive pause for consolidation, after a bold step forward last year, but also for 
the testing of new ideas, with a view to a new big advance in reform next year.9 
On Chinese New Year, 9 February, it was proclaimed that "we must be bold as 
tigers in this Year of the Tiger".lo For his pa& Du Runsheng, in his report on 
rural work published at the end of January, said categorically that egalitarian- 
ism must be utterly repudiated - "to deny the need for differences in rewards is 
to negate the reforms themselves".ll There was, however, very little indeed 
said about the theories or broad principles of the new society which is being 
shaped by the reform. 
In the spring of 1986, this situation suddenly changed, and the Chinese be- 
gan speaking of the need for a comprehensive theoretical framework to define 
the nature of the new system which is emerging. It might seem to foreigners 
that whether or not there is a theory about China's reforms is of little practical 
importance, though the Chinese may worry about the problem because of 
their need to reconcile their practice with Marxism. In my view, the call for a 
systematic theoretical analysis will, on the contrary, have considerable in- 
fluence on the scope and on the stability of the reforms. 
It is important, in any case, to underscore the difference in this respect be- 
tween 1986 and 1984. In 1984, when the campaign against "spiritual pollu- 
tion" was suddenly halted, the opponents of this witch-hunt did not launch a 
theoretical counter-offensive. Instead, they shifted the ground of controversy 
from theory to practice, and argued very forcefully that the new policies based 
on material incentives, the decentralization of authority, and the negation of 
the egalitarianism of the Cultural Revolution would work, and would rapidly 
bring prosperity not only to a few successful entrepreneurs, but to the whole 
country. There was, on the other hand, no attempt to explain the kind of so- 
ciety which these reform would produce. There are two apparent reasons for 
this, which are probably complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
First, Deng Xiaoping and the promoters of reform no doubt did not know at 
the outset exactly where they were going. They wanted to shake up the old 
system, breathe new life into the economy, and then see what happened. Sec- 
ondly, there may well have been the fear that, if the blueprint were drawn up, 
it would look too much like the "restoration of capitalism" which some leftists 
in other countries (and also in China) think is under way. Deng Xiaoping is, of 
course, quite certain  at a "planned socialist commodity economy" is a more 
efficient way of running a socialist country, and not a return to capitalism. But 
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despite collective ownership of the means of production, the degree of income 
differentiation, the appeal to entrepreneurial instincts, and above all the lega- 
lization, within certain limits, of hired labour, raise many questions. 
The anxieties existing just below the surface were dramatically illustrated 
by the incident, in December 1985, of the article by a young Chinese scholar 
called Ma Ding, in which foreign newspapers played a not altogether credit- 
able role. His discussion of how Chinese economists were trying to make use 
of positive elements in Western economic theories12 was presented by Asahi 
Shimbun as a repudiation of Marx in favour of Keynes, just as the People's 
Daily editorial of 7 December 1984 had been widely seen abroad as a negation 
of Marx. This misinterpretation was further distorted by a Chinese-language 
newspaper published in New York, the Zhongbao. And in this case, too, the 
author of the article was, as a result, blamed for the confusion, and subjected 
to criticism in China, especially by doctrinaire ideologists such as Deng Liqun 
and Hu Qiaomu. 
This time, however, people high up in the Chinese Communist Party ap- 
pear to have decided that the continuing uncertainty about the shape of the 
emerging new order was more dangerous than attacking the problem square- 
ly. The way to such an approach was no doubt opened by an as yet unpublish- 
ed speech by Hu Yaobang at the very beginning of 1986. In it, Hu noted the 
decline of the people's faith in Marxism not only in China, but throughout the 
world. Calling for an examination of the ideological inadequacies and politi- 
cal errors leading to this long-term development, Hu urged the Chinese to 
search for innovative answers to new problems so as to reverse the trend.13 
In late March 1986, a writing group of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences published an article in People's Daily stating that the many problems 
encountered, in the last two years especially, in implementing the Sixth Five- 
Year Plan, resulted, among other causes, from the fact that "theoretical prep- 
aration was extremely inadequate".14 During the ensuing weeks, the message 
that the time had now come to remedy this, and to produce a comprehensive 
new theory based on China's experience of "commodity socialism", was au- 
thoritatively proclaimed. Many of the most striking new formulations were 
advanced during the period when the Seventh Five-Year Plan was under con- 
sideration by the National People's Congress, or immediately afterward, 
some of them in the Plan itself, or in Zhao Ziyang's report introducing it. 
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Theory and Practice in the Period of "Replacing 
the Old System by the New" 
The idea of a change in the system, economic and ultimately political as well, 
features prominently in the Plan, where it is stated in the terms cited above: 
"replacing the old system by the new" (xinjiu tizhi zhuanhuan). Broadly it 
may be noted that the targets, and the annual rate of increase in the produc- 
tion of all sectors of the economy, have been deliberately scaled down, not 
only to avoid negative economic and financial side-effects, but above all to 
create a suitable climate for further structural reforms. 
It is this political dimension of the Seventh Five-Year Plan which I feel com- 
petent to analyse, and about which I will now make some comments. The 
first, and in some ways the most significant point is the clear statement, in the 
opening section, that of the three tasks - reform, economic growth and 
technological progress, and improving living standards - reform is the most 
important. This objective is formulated as follows: 
Take a further step forward in creating, by reform of the economic struc- 
ture, a favourable economic and social environment, strive to maintain a 
basic balance between total social demand and supply, thus enabling the 
reform to unfold more successfully, and work hard to lay the ground- 
work for a new type of socialist economic structure with Chinese charac- 
teristics within five years or a little longer. 
As for the content of these ongoing structural reforms, there are three main 
points: to strengthen the decision-making powers of individual enterprises, to 
increase the role of the market, and to exercise state control more and more by 
indirect rather than direct means. In some respects, the content and even the 
language of the Plan follow fairly closely those of 'the Decision of October 
1984, but in other respects the Plan marks a step ahead. For example, the sec- 
tion on structural reform contains the following passage: 
We shall further streamline government administration and delegate 
more power to lower levels. Except for a few special government depart- 
ments and industries, no ministries, provinces, or autonomous regions 
will exercise direct control over enterprises. City government functions 
must be separated from those of enterprises so that enterprises will beco- 
me relatively independent socialist commodity producers and dealers, 
with full authority over their own management and full responsibility for 
their own profits and losses. 
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The formulation just quoted, calling for the emergence of "independent social- 
ist commodity-producing enterprises", echoes almost exactly the 1984 Deci- 
sion, but the emphasis is today placedmore strongly on extending the scope of 
the responsibility system, and above all on reducing the role of mandatory 
planning.15 Price differentials between high-grade and ordinary products will 
be increased, in order to make greater use of the regulating function of prices, 
and generally speaking the emphasis in economic development will be shifted 
toward quality, rather that mere quantity. 
This point, of course, is closely linked to the call for increasingly rapid tech- 
nological progress, in order to catch up with advanced world levels. The im- 
portance of high technology has been emphasized in China for a number of 
years, but it is stressed, if possible, even more in the new Five-Year Plan. At 
the same time, the importance both of education, and of exchanges with fore- 
ign countries, in promoting the introduction of the most modern technology is 
dealt with at considerable length, in the Plan itself, and in Zhao Ziyang's re- 
port. 
Zhao Ziyang refers to what he called the "strategic role" of progress in edu- 
cation and science in adapting to the ongoing process of technological change. 
This obvious point needs no further comment, except that, unlike some 
Western countries, including Britain, China places stress both on applied and 
on basic research .I6 
The aspects of the Seventh Five-Year Plan discussed above refer explicitly to 
reform of the economic system, but it is quite evident that they have political 
implications as well. Just how important these are is symbolized by the term 
used to characterize the next five years: "the period of replacing the old system 
by the new". The statement that the whole of the "old system" was in the pro- 
cess of being replaced by a new order, and the calls for the elaboration of a 
comprehensive theory defining that new order, were plainly extremely wor- 
rying to those who felt that reform was going too far too fast, and threatened 
to get out of hand. 
Just as the Decision of October 1984 required all Party members, whatever 
their own ideas, to accept henceforth that China had a "planned socialist com- 
modity economy", so the publication of authoritative articles spelling out in 
more detail what is meant by "socialism with Chinese characteristics" would 
make it much more difficult to argue for the reversal of current policies.17 
Early in 1986, influential figures in the leadership still devoted to Leninist 
doctrine as it has long been understood, such as Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, 
were seeking to make of such ideological issues the main topic of discussion at 
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the forthcoming Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, then scheduled for 
June 1986. Had som of the old dogmas thus been formally reasserted by the 
Party, the conservatives rather than the reformers would have been in a posi- 
tion to take advantage of the principle of "democratic centralism" which limits 
the scope for public dissent once a view has been openly adopted. In effect, the 
partisans of such ideas, backed by Chen Yun at the very top, were trying to 
hold, after a two-year delay, the conference on ideology and "communist 
ideals" which had originally been fixed for the spring of 1984, but had been 
quietly shelved after the collapse of the campaign against "spiritual pollu- 
tion". 
Once again, however, their efforts were frustrated. By April, the agenda for 
the Sixth Plenum (which finally met only in September) had been changed to 
deal not with "thought" or "ideology" (sixiang), a code word for fidelity to Le- 
ninist dogmas, but with the much vaguer and less controversial topic of build- 
ing "socialist spiritual civilization". 
Mainly, Hu Yaobang had this controversy in mind when on 9 April 1986 he 
addressed the problem of "contradictions within the Party",18 thereby reveal- 
ing the existence of divergent views at the highest levels of the Party. This 
speech was openly published only in July, but in mid-April, during a visit to 
the Taihang Mountains, Hu put the same points even more bluntly, remark- 
ing : 
There are some comrades who do not recognize that there are contradic- 
tions within the Party. In reality, there are contradictions in everything 
that exists in the world, and everything develops amidst contradictions 
and the resolution of contradictions. We must not fear contradictions 
within the Party, and we must not evade them. The contradictions within 
the Party are for the most part the result of differing views about our work 
and about our understanding of the situation. Under normal circum- 
stances, such contradictions are not antagonistic, and can very well be re- 
solved. We should use the methods of exchange of ideas, democratic con- 
sultation, private talks, and mutual understanding and tolerance. If we 
use the correct methods, we need not fear trouble, and we need not fear 
democracy (buyao pa mafan, buyao pa minzhu) .I9 
In raising the issue of contradictions withifi the Party in this way, Hu Yaobang 
appears to have had two aims: to reassure, and to warn. By stressing that dif- 
ferences of opinion should be resolved by "private talks, and mutual under- 
standing and tolerance", he signalled that there was to be no witch-hunt, and 
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that the partisans of reform wished to unite all members of the leadership 
around an agreed policy line. But at the same time, it was made crystal clear, 
both in Hu's speech and in other statements last spring, that in the last analysis 
the reform process would be pushed forward vigorously, and that those who 
had doubts about it would have to fall into line. 
In any case, the fact that since the spring of 1986 the balance has been tilted 
more and more in favour of the "reformers" in China results in significant de- 
gree from the support which such views have received from the very top of the 
Party hierarchy. In late April, on a visit to Shanghai, Hu Qili encouraged so- 
cial scientists to take advantage of the blow which had been dealt by the re- 
forms to outmoded ideas, develop new theories in the light of current pro- 
blems, and play their full role as the "think tank of the Party and the govern- 
ment".20 This emphasis on the importance of the social sciences in analyzing 
the effects of the reforms was already to be found in the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan ( ~ a r . 2 7 ) . ~ ~  A few days later, the new Head of the Propaganda Depart- 
ment of the Central Committee, Zhu Houze, held a meeting on 22 April with 
theoretical workers, journalists, and those in charge of social science insti- 
tutes, at which he called on them to study thoroughly the laws of a socialist 
commodity economy in all of their ramifications, and thus to facilitate the de- 
velopment of the reforms. There was no precedent or model for the reforms, 
he said, and there must therefore be new breakthroughs (tupo) on the theoreti- 
cal level. In carrying out this task, he added, social scientists, while holding to 
the "four basic principles", should think for themselves, put forward different 
views and argue them in a relaxed atmosphere, in accordance with the policy 
of a "hundred flowers and a hundred schools"." 
A number of those Zhu Houze addressed on 22 April had, in fact, already 
taken this injunction to heart. A large part of the 21 April issue of the Shanghai 
World Economic Herald (Shijie jingji daobao) was devoted to the call for theo- 
retical breakthroughs to accompany and support the reforms. The lead article 
by Su Shaozhi argues that these breakthroughs must include breaking with 
certain ideas and conclusions of Mam himself, while remaining true to the 
Marxist method. Marx, Su points out, made extensive use of bourgeois econ- 
omic works; the critical assimilation of ideas from all quarters is therefore an 
integral part of Marxism. The Chinese reforms are, according to Su, the first 
serious attempt since Stalin put an end to Lenin's New Economic Policy to de- 
vise a method for building socialism different from the Stalinist model, which 
had been applied in China for over thirty years. Quite clearly, since China be- 
gan Soviet-style economic development only in 1953, the reference to "over 
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thirty years" means from 1953 to the decision of October 1984. Reform itself, 
said Su, is a breakthrough, and'must therefore involve constant theoretical ex- 
ploration and ruptures with past dogmas.23 
The World Economic Herald had, in fact, reprinted Ma Ding's contentious 
article, referred to above, two weeks previously.Z4 There is an interview with 
Ma Ding himself on the first page of the 21 April issue, and several contribu- 
tors, including Yu Guangyuan, stress the positive effect which the article has 
had in provoking a debate, and thereby giving rise to a new upsurge of the 
"Hundred Flowers" policy, launched exactly thirty years ago, in May 1956, 
and then prematurely abandoned. Those who criticize Ma Ding's article as 
"anti-Marxist" and as a form of "spiritual pollution" are, these authors argue, 
"Whateverists" of Marxist dogma, unwilling to take account of changing real- 
ity, not real disciples of  mar^.^^ Moreover, although the Five-Year Plan stipu- 
lates that the relative pause in structural reform, announced at the beginning 
of 1986, should last for the first two years of the current five-year period, an 
article in the same issue of World Economic Herald announces that the "rele- 
vant departments" are studying the possibility of pushing forward again next 
year and the year after, in order to resolve the contradictions arising from the 
simultaneous existence of the old and new systems, and to put the components 
of the new system in a commanding position at an early date.26 
Open debate as a method for resolving ideological disagreements inside and 
outside the Party, as presently recommended by Zhu Houze and others, is of 
course symbolized by the slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred 
schools of thought contend!" This formula, originally put forward in China 
during the Warring States period, and revived by Mao Zedong in 1956, has 
been once more proclaimed as valid since 1978, but the thirtieth anniversary 
of the speeches by Mao and Lu Dingyi in May 1956 which marked the begin- 
ning of a year of "blooming and contending" in 1956-57 has served as the oc- 
casion for several conferences and symposia, and the publication of an un- 
usually large number of extremely bold and forthright articles and speeches 
on this theme. 
Chinese officials and intellectuals of various tendencies have all felt obliged 
to join in this chorus of praise to the "two hundreds". They include, for exam- 
ple, Hu Sheng, the relatively conservative President of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, and close associate of Deng Liqun, who caused extracts 
from two talks at the Academy in August and December 1985 dealing with 
this theme among others to be published in Hongqi on 1 May 1986.27 The most 
influential contributions to this debate, however, have come from those who 
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wished to use the "two hundreds" to justify the exploration of radically new 
ideas. 
Of the numerous striking statements published in May and June 1986, on 
the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary, only a few can be quoted here. The 
first is an article by Yu Guangyuan in which, after recounting in detail the cir- 
cumstances in which the slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred 
schools contend!" was put forward in 1956, he analyses the reasons why, in 
his view, it has been so little observed during the ensuing thirty years. Among 
these, he cites Mao's remark at the time that the "hundred schools" amounted 
in fact to only two schools - the bourgeois school and the proletarian school. 
In other words, the idea of genuine pluralism within the proletarian or social- 
ist camp was totally foreign to Mao. Yu also referred to the persistent leftist 
trend since the late 1950's, and the fact that, in those early years, there was no 
understanding either of socialist structural reform (shehuizhuyi tizhigaige) or 
of the importance of opening to the outside world.28 
Another, and very bold discussion of these issues is that of Su Shaozhi, in 
which the author begins by pointing out that the abolition of the "two hun- 
dreds" slogan was the result of the action of the Qin autocracy, with its goal of 
"uniformity of thought" (sixiang yizhi). Thus a formula consistently re- 
garded, until very recently, as a socialist ideal and the symbol of the Leninist 
"Party spirit" was stigmatized as a "feudal relic". Linking the non-implemen- 
tation of the "hundred flowers" in the 1950's and 1960's to the absence of free- 
dom (including the freedom to make mistakes), and to the absence of socialist 
democracy, as well as to the influence of the "overly-centralized Stalinist mo- 
del", Su concludes: 
"In a socialist country, reform is another great transformation (biange), it 
is an innovation.. . . There is no precedent in history,, and there are no an- 
swers to be found in books. We must dare to break the shackles of all tra- 
ditional things, boldly explore, dare to break through all accepted conclu- 
sions, including important individual (gebie) conclusions of Marxism. 
We must be good at deriving new concepts and drawing new conclusions 
from real life. This has made new demands in resolutely carrying out the 
"two hundreds" policy. "29 
Another highly significant straw in the wind is the appearance, in one of two 
symposia on the "two hundreds" reported in People's Daily in June, of a con- 
tribution by that very Ma Ding who had been the victim of so much abuse six 
months earlier. While describing himself as a "young scholar", and expressing 
his desire to learn from his elders, Ma shows no signs of repentance. On the 
contrary, he calls unequivocally for strengthening socialist democracy and 
the legal system, and for freedom of creation, research, and scholarship, as 
well as for equality among scholars and the repudiation of special privileges 
which allow some to overawe or oppress others.30 
However striking these and other theoretical developments may be, the 
crucial issue is, of course, how long the trend inagurated last spring, and 
which still continues, can endure. The changing intellectual climate can and 
does influence the prospects of further political change, but in the last analysis 
it is the reform of the political system which will be decisive. What are the pro; 
spects for its continuation? 
Political Reform 
Among the various factors affecting this, three can be mentioned here: public 
opinion, the balance of forces within the leadership, and relations with the 
outside world. 
Although, in the Chinese political system as it exists today, the position of 
the leadership is undoubtedly the most important factor, the attitude of the 
Chinese people generally is more important, and less easily manipulated, than 
it used to be. Chinese public opinion is by no means uniform. It has been 
shaped, like Chinese society as a whole, by several different sets of values: 
those of the traditional, pre-modern culture (which the Chinese call "feudal"); 
those of the capitalist world, to which the country has been exposed mainly 
before 1949 and since 1978; and the egalitarian and collectivist ethos propa- 
gated during Mao's last two decades. The result, as observed last April, is 
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, both the traditional disdain for 
"merchants" (shangren) and Maoist values lead many people to look down on 
those who engage in "business". For example, young intellectuals told the au- 
thor that, when buying vegetables from the markets, they would always buy 
from the peasants, who had brought their own produce to Beijing, and not 
from intermediaries, who had gone to the countryside and purchased veg- 
etables for resale at a profit in the city. Their view was that the peasants had in- 
vested their own labour, and it was therefore legitimate for them to receive a 
financial reward. "Speculation", on the other hand, was not regarded as a use- 
ful contribution to society - even though the press has carried articles arguing 
that, by supplying needs, such merchants are doing useful work. 
On the other hand, in some respects, public opinion is explicitly and sharp- 
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ly anti-feudal. The aspect of the current situation which arouses the greatest 
anger and resentment is probably the frequency with which the children of 
high cadres themselves become officials, and more broadly the whole idea of a 
"third echelon" of leaders waiting to take over not only from Deng Xiaoping, 
but from men in their 70s like Hu Yaobang, and men in their 60s like Zhao 
Ziyang. Such selection by the previous leaders of their successors is seen as a 
continuation of the pattern set by Mao, which was in itself marked by "feudal" 
influences. Hostility to these practices was, in fact, one of the main causes of 
the incidents of 18 September 1985, for which anti-Japanese sentiments, while 
they do exist, were in large part a pretext. These events were, however, the 
work of a number of different currents, each trying to exploit the situation to 
its own ends, including some groups hostile to the reforms. The motives of 
these opponents of the current policies are to be found both in the fact that 
rising prices favour the peasants at the expense of the urban population, and in 
concern at "unrighteous tendencies". The latter concept, of which so much has 
been heard since 1985, is however a highly ambiguous one. To the extent that 
it refers to speculation and profiteering, it might be seen as anti-capitalist, but 
to the extent that it is aimed at nepotism and the abuse of official position, it 
might be regarded rather as anti-feudal. 
Broadly speaking, it is the author's impression that most Chinese are now in 
sympathy with the reforms, simply because the overall standard of living is 
rising. At the same time, the anti-corruption drive has uncovered a number of 
offenders among the families of those who have shown most zeal in combat- 
ting "spiritual pollution", the most notorious case being that of the son of Hu 
Qiaomu, recently sentenced to a long prison term for enriching himself 
through illegal transactions. "This man sets himself up as a teacher of 
communist morality," many people remark scathingly, "and yet he cannot 
bring up his own son." 
Although instances such as this have undermined Hu's standing, his in- 
fluence, and that of others in the leadership, such as Chen Yun, Deng Liqun, 
and Peng Zhen, sceptical about reform and fearful of its consequences remain 
strong. Thus, to the extent that the direction of policy in the future will depend 
on the balance of forces in the leadership, the position has not yet been entirely 
clarified. 
It would, as noted earlier, be quite wrong to set up a model of Deng Xiao- 
ping and Chen Yun as polar opposites, and to predict China's future course en- 
tirely in terms of which of the two men remains on the scene and in a position 
of power longer than the other. Though Deng is unquestionably far bolder in 
experimenting with radically new ideas, Chen Yun, too, has called for cease- 
less (buduan) advance on the road to reform. But he was careful to add, in his 
speech of June 1985, that China must only advance along the correct road. 
The only kind of structural reform China wanted to pursue, he said then, isso- 
cialist structural reform, and he called for a resolute struggle against "all erron- 
eous words and actions" contrary to the ideal of comm~nism.~~ In late January 
of 1986, Peng Zhen, another representative of the same tendency, denounced 
ideas opposed to Marxism, by which he plainly meant ideas contrary to tradi- 
tional interpretations of Marxism, and in particular the article of Ma Ding.32 
On April 19, speaking to a delegation from Hong Kong, Deng Xiaoping 
said that for the moment there had been a slight slowdown in the pace, but this 
was "in order to consolidate and digest the results of the reforms, and to pre- 
pare for carrying out even greater reforms in the future". Reform, he said, in- 
volved risks, but it was the fruit of deep reflection and study, and must be re- 
solutely pursued. "The heart of the Seventh Five-Year Plan is reform", he de- 
clared, adding that within three to five years, the economic system would 
have been basically adjusted in a way that would assure stability for 60 to 70 
years, to the middle of the next century.33 
On 23 April, Deng told the former Japanese Prime Minister, Fukuda Takeo, 
that the period of this Five-Year Plan would be of decisive importance in deter- 
mining whether or not the reforms would succeed. "This road is correct", he 
stated, "it is the road we must follow, there is no other road we can take".34 As 
long as Deng Xiaoping remains the dominant figure in the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party, there can be no doubt that China will follow this 
road, though with some zig/zags and occasional calls to order in the ideologi- 
cal realm. But how much does the continuity of Chinese policy, and the stabil- 
ity of the Chinese political system, depend on Deng? 
Liao Gailong said to the author in April 1986 in Beijing that, without Deng 
Xiaoping, there would no doubt have been some process of reform in China 
after 1976, but it would have developed more slowly, and above all it would 
not have been so radical and comprehensive. The author discussed this ques- 
tion with a number of other leading Chinese intellectuals, and though there is 
a natural tendency on the part of Marxists to play down the role of the individ- 
ual, the author found no one who disagreed with this judgment. 
In any case, Deng Xiaoping did launch the reforms in 1978, and after a per- 
iod of eight years, they have developed a momentum such that, with every 
further year that passes, it will be more difficult to halt the process. Apart 
from elite sentiment and public opinion, the process of reform had begun, by 
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July 1986, to involve the promotion of institutional change, in the political as 
well as in the economic domains. A theoretical symposium on political struc- 
ture was held from 10 to 12 July at the Central Party School, at the instigation 
of Deng X i a ~ p i n g , ~ ~  and in July also a "Commission on the Reform of the State 
Structure" was formed at a very high 
One of the first published statements on the theme of political reform was 
that by Wan Li, originally made at a forum on scientific research on 31 
The same issue of People's Daily which carried this speech also reprinted, and 
thus gave added weight to, an article by Su Shaozhi calling, as an important 
aspect of political reform and of the struggle against China's "feudal" heritage, 
for recognition of the duty of elected officials to represent their diverse consti- 
tuencies, with their differing interests and differing ideas, rather than simply 
repeating a line laid down from on high.38 
Many more articles about ideological diversity, and about the need for ex- 
perimentation with political institutions, continued to appear.39 In early Sep- 
tember, this trend received endorsement at the very top. On 1 September, ex- 
tracts from Hu Yaobang's talks during a visit to Qinghai were published under 
the title "Reform has already become an irreversible historical tide". Among 
his remarks was the statement that Deng Xiaoping's speech of 18 August 1980 
was "the programmatic document guiding our reform of the political sys- 
tem.lr40 
For his part, Deng Xiaoping, receiving the chairman of the Japanese Komei- 
to, asserted that "failure to carry out the reform of the political system would 
obstruct the development of the productive forces". (bugao zhengzhi tizhi 
gaige hui zu'ai shengchanli fazhan). Pressed by his interlocutor as to whether 
this whole matter would be resolved at the forthcoming Sixth Plenum, Deng 
replied that this would be premature, though the subject might be touched 
upon. "We must be prudent in taking policy decisions," he declared. "Every 
time we make a step forward, we must see that the possibility of success is rela- 
tively great before we make up our minds."*I 
One can well understand Deng Xiaoping's caution, for the current trend to- 
ward intellectual pluralism and institutional reform, however hedged about 
with safeguards, has potentially revolutionary implications for the Chinese 
political system as a whole. And yet, the Sixth Plenum, while indeed not spel- 
ling out in detail the mechanics of political reform, strikingly confirmed the 
ideological trends of the preceding six months. 
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The Resolution on Socialist Spiritual Civilization 
The Resolution, understandably, stresses the need to take Marxism as a guide 
in building a socialist spiritual civilization (or, as the new official translation 
has it, "a socialist society with an advanced culture and ideology"). It is note- 
worthy, however, that in the long text, there is only one reference to "Marx- 
ism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought", as against approximately 20 refer- 
ences simply to "Marxism". It has already been noted above that Deng Xiao- 
ping's criticism, in his August 1980 speech, of the Soviet tradition as a source 
for the autocratic practices of the Maoist era, and the fact that some leading 
ideologists had traced these defects back beyond Stalin to Lenin himself. 
There have, in fact, been those in China in recent years who wanted to replace 
the hyphen in "Marxism-Leninism" by a comma, thus underscoring the point 
that Leninism was not necessarily the definitive formulation of Marxist 
thought. Hitherto, such a change, which would have far-reaching symbolic 
implications, has not been accepted by the Party leadership, but the concen- 
tration on "Marxism" in the September 1986 Resolution points in the same di- 
rection. 
Moreover, the Resolution states that "in many ways our work to promote 
socialist culture and ideology has not been adapted to the needs of socialist 
modernization, reform and the opening of the country to the outside world, 
even though the Party has already "abandoned a series of ossified concepts" in 
its interpretation of Marxism. While insisting that Party leadership must be 
upheld, the Resolution states that there can be "no socialist modernization 
without democracy", and that the "policy-malting process" must be "democ- 
ratized, and given a more scientific basis, in the context of the "two hun- 
dreds" policy. Finally, it is stated that "no country can progress if it refuses to 
accept elements of advanced science and culture from abroad."42 
None of these propositions are dramatically new in themselves, and as 
Deng had predicted a few weeks earlier, the Plenum carefully avoided spelling 
out in concrete detail what was meant by the democratic reform of the politi- 
cal institutions. Understandably, in view of the fact that high-level official dis- 
cussion has barely begun, there is as yet no blueprint for political reform anal- 
ogous to that drawn up by Liao Gailong in his "Gengshen Reform" speech of 
October 1980. Evoking the need "to reform and perfect the Party and state 
leadership systems, and to take a step further in extending socialist democracy 
and improving the socialist legal system", the Resolution declares: "This will 
be a very complex task. After exhaustive investigation and study, the Central 
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Committee will work out plans for accomplishing it, so that political reform 
may proceed step by step and with proper guidance."43 
None the less, if one looks at this document as a whole, one cannot fail to be 
struck by the fact that, if it does not contain all the new ideas which have been 
put forward in recent months by some of the bolder spirits among the reform- 
ing intellectuals, it does endorse, in more prudent terms, many of their views, 
while containing very little indeed by way of concession to the sceptics fearful 
of the consequences of reform. The passage just quoted, about proceeding 
"step by step" after "exhaustive investigation" may be taken to mean that 
these elements in the Party will be consulted, but that in the last analysis they 
will not be able to block the progress of the reforms. For, as the Resolution 
goes on to state, "unless we . . . combat all practices that repress and undermine 
democracy,. . . we shall not be able to maintain long-term political stability." 
The warning is clear. 
Perhaps the impact and importance of this resolution can best be assessed in 
terms of the contrast with the doctrinaire manifesto some elements in the 
leadership originally intended the Sixth Plenum to produce. But at the same 
time, the document manifestly reflects a compromise. Deng Xiaoping is too 
experienced and too skilled a politician not to seek the greatest possible mea- 
sure of support from the widest possible range of opinion within the Party on 
each occasion, consistent with the pursuit of his own long-term goals. 
Indeed, it is undoubtedly because Deng does play the central and crucial 
role of arbiter between those more and less enthusiastic about reform, and 
plays it so authoritatively and successfully, that virtually everyone wants him 
to remain at his post as long as possible. Deng himself has recently alluded to 
this on more than one occasion, saying that he wants to retire at the 13th Party 
Congress next September, but that perhaps people won't let him.44 
But what if he should not remain in office? Chen Yun and his supporters are 
powerful men, and their influence remains great. Would Hu Yaobang, Zhao 
Ziyang, Hu Qili and others of like mind be able to maintain the momentum of 
the reforms, if Deng Xiaoping were to go before Chen? It is the author's guess 
that they would, but it might be a very finely-balanced situation. On the other 
hand, the cost of another radical change of course, toward a more orthodox 
Leninist model, in terms of confusion, lost time, and the loss of economic mo- 
mentum, would clearly be very great, and even those leaders with a certain 
nostalgia for the 1950's might hesitate to incur such a cost. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In drawing up an estimate of the situation and making their choice, the future 
leaders of China, whoever they may be, will also have to take account of the 
impact of the current open policies on the country's economic development. 
During the past seven years, since Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in 
1979, China has reaped enormous benefits from her growing interaction with 
the West and with Japan, not only in economic terms, and in terms of techno- 
logical know-how, but in terms of goodwill. A turn back to a Leninist, or Sta- 
linist model would in large measure sacrifice all that. On the other hand, the 
present good relationship with the capitalist world brings with it a continuing 
process of intellectual interchange, which some in the Chinese Communist 
Party regard as a source of "spiritual pollution", but which is increasingly 
seen, even by relatively conservative elements in the Party, as in many repects 
positive. 
There is a very great interest on the part of Chinese scholars, including some 
who formerly took a different view, in problems such as the impact of tech- 
nological change on society, "systems theory", the "information society", and 
so on, and an active desire to engage in discussion with foreign scholars on 
these topics and to integrate the results of such reflection into their own Mar- 
xist interpretation of the world in the late 20th century. In November, even a 
figure such as Hu Sheng, President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
who is closely associated with Deng Liqun, spoke in favour of such an ap- 
proach, and of reform of the political system, at a conference in Beijing. 
Thus the predominant trends in the economic, political, intellectual and 
cultural domains are broadly convergent, and serve to reinforce one another. 
I believe, therefore, that the reform of the economic system, which is unthink- 
able without the continuation of the open-door policy, and can scarcely go 
forward successfully without further political reforms, will be maintained for 
the foreseeable future. 
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